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Epidemiology for and with a Distrustful
Community
by Raymond R. Neutra*
The epidemiology of diseases associated with chemical waste disposal sites has often been delayed for
years after the affected community became aware of the exposure. Frequently, this has resulted in an
aroused neighborhood community that is distrustful ofthose public agencies and officials responsible for
protecting their health. It is thus important that positive steps be taken to alleviate the antagonism and
to involve the community in an active and constructive role in the epidemiology study. This paper presents
a case history of such an incident and highlights some of the lessons learned.
The first steps were to involve and inform the community. A citizen and industry advisory committee
was formed to participate in the work, publish a newsletter, and conduct regular community meetings.
Thenewsletterandthecommunity meetingswere usedto identifyproblems andtoexplainthem; todescribe
uncertainties of a scientific as well as of political or financial nature; to involve community leaders,
including those distrustful; to conduct an epidemiologic census and a neighborhood environmental ex-
posure survey.
The end results were a defusing of the antagonism toward authorities, complete acceptance by the
community ofthe merit ofthe report, a higher quality ofreport than might otherwise have been possible,
and the freedom to move toward alleviating the problems of the disposal site.
Introduction
Hazardous waste dumpsite epidemiology has up to
the present been primarily initiated by prolonged de-
mands for investigation by the affected communities.
By the time the epidemiologist arrives on the scene,
years may have gone by, and the various factions in the
community are often at odds with each other and dis-
trustful of any outside official whom they fear may con-
tinue to play down or even cover up any health effects
of the site.
These dumpsite studies are not sensitive instruments
for detecting the relatively small increments of disease
incidence which are of regulatory interest because of
small sample sizes, uncertainty about exposure, short
followup periods, and the lack of definitive laboratory
tests to indicate exposure or preclinical insult. Dem-
onstratedincreases inthe more commonsubjective com-
plaints, which often occur around these sites, can be
attributed to a variety of methodological biases.
Forthese reasonsthe clientcommunities, though ask-
ing for a definitive resolution oftheir health questions,
are often left with only a modest reduction in the range
ofuncertainty and potential for controversy and differ-
ing interpretation ofresults. This means that early and
continuing involvement of various community factions
is essential tomake surethatthe community hasenough
input into the process of the study and the interpreta-
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tions of results to assure themselves that a good faith
effort has been made.
Our title also talks about epidemiology with a dis-
trustful community. Residents near a hazardous waste
site, like workers in a plant, have a number of poten-
tially valuable epidemiological roles to play. They are
often the ones who first notice an unusual occurrence
ofdisease. They have the best insight into the potential
ongoingroutes ofexposure. They may be aware oftran-
sitory episodes ofhigh level exposure (e.g., a particular
neighborhood flood). They have a legitimate role in
pointing out the implications ofalternate interpretation
ofthe results and making sure that matters ofscientific
judgment are not disguised as matters ofscientific fact.
Finally, community members can be helpful in the
design, conduct, and interpretation of an epidemiolog-
ical study as long as their role does not violate the con-
fidentiality oftheir neighbors or lead to possible biases
(or the appearance of possible biases) in the study. In
a recent Los Angeles study, community members sug-
gested topics (but not exact questionnaire items) to be
covered in a study and carried out a door-to-door census
(results were sealed in an envelope and carried back
unopened to the Health Department to maintain con-
fidentiality). Thus, working with an affected commu-
nity, when correctly done, can improve the scientific
quality of a study. It can also foster better understand-
ing and acceptance of the final results. This kind of
involvement ofstudy subjects is quite contrary to usual
epidemiological practice, which tries to keep the sub-R. R. NEUTRA
jects as unaware as possible of the hypothesis being
tested. However, dumpsite epidemiology hasadifferent
audience than traditional epidemiology.
In atraditional epidemiological situation, the decision
to do a study is that of the epidemiologist. The epide-
miologist writes for other scientists who may regard
him or her with some muted scientific skepticism, but
who look carefully at the materials and methods section
and decide on the basis ofthat whether ornot to believe
what he or she says. They share basically the same
beliefs,about physiology and toxicology and have the
same kind ofsophistication about statistics. Indumpsite
epidemiology, however, the decision to do a study is
often made by the affected community. The audience,
although many epidemiologists do not realize this, is
really the affected community, and only incidentally
other scientists. The attitude towards the study may
be outright distrust. There is distrust about one's mo-
tives and qualifications: Are you covering up? Are you
in league with industry? If you are in a state health
department, are you competent?
The people in the community do not share our views
on what is physiologically possible and not possible. They
certainly feeluncomfortable withprobabilities and view
talk about "lifetime risks" as ifsomeone were gambling
with their health. In many ways, this is like dealing
with a distrustful patient from another culture. I per-
sonally began my medical career as a public health of-
ficer on the Navaho Indian reservation, and I see many
parallels. There are many lessons to be learned from
treating people of another culture which relate to com-
municating with a community near a dumpsite. One
needs to understand the health beliefs ofthe people for
whom one is doing the study. One needs to negotiate a
shared-belief model. With the Navaho, when treating
a tubercular patient, I had to realize that they believed
that their disease was due to some kind of witchcraft
or a broken taboo. I thought it was due to exposure to
tubercle bacilli, but they really had a point. Eighty per-
cent of the people on the reservation were tuberculin-
positive, and most of those did not have active tuber-
culosis. So we agreed that they would have some kind
of Navaho treatment (which I tended to view as being
directed towards their compromised immune system)
while I went after the tubercle bacillus with chemo-
therapy. Once that was negotiated, good compliance
could be achieved. There are analogies in dealing with
community fears about health effects from hazardous
waste sites and trying to understand what they think
the problem is rather than studying (like the drunk
looking for keys under the lamp light) that which can
be looked at reliably. The basic admonition here is to
pay attention to the hypotheses and concerns of the
affected communities. At the minimum it is respectful,
at best it may lead you to real health effects which
current theory had not foreseen.
In this presentation we will discuss the neighborhood
communities because there is always more than one
constituency to which we must relate. We will discuss
why dumpsite epidemiology is usually equivocal and
therefore open to controversy, and we will deal with
the emotional pitfalls into which we as epidemiologists
tend to fall in dealing with these problems. We will
examine these in the context of a case history.
A Case History
We will begin with a case history which illustrates
the above mentioned issues so well. Imagine yourself
as an oil producer in the early 1940s. War is on its way,
and there is a tremendous demand for aviation fuel. A
simple way to produce it is to add sulfuric acid to crude
oil. Aviation fuel can be decanted offthe top, and acid-
tarry materials will go to the bottom. There are no
technologies for recycling the sulfuric acid, so the acid-
tarry material is hauled to the remote oil fields in the
foothills of Southern California. A bulldozer comes in,
makes a kind of pond with a berm, and then the acid-
petroleum sludge is dumped there. There is no one liv-
ingwithinmilesofthe site. Now, 40yearslater, suburbs
have grown up next to this site, a golf course has been
built over some of the ponds, a redwood fence around
another, and $300,000 homes havebeenbuilt all around.
People are sold those homes with the promise that con-
dominiums and golf courses will be built in the area.
They move in. In the evening, they are sitting in their
Jacuzi and suddenly they are exposed to acrid fumes-
nauseating, choking irritating fumes that aggravate their
asthma. They discover they are living next to a haz-
ardous waste site. Immediately people start breaking
ranks. Thereisagroupconcerned abouthealth-mostly
mothers withyoungchildren, some ofwhomhavehealth
effects that they attribute to this site. They are very
worried and want to have something done. The local
homeowners' association is mostly concerned about the
economic issues and tries to quiet these women: "Don't
make too much of a fuss because property values will
start to go down." The city officials are there. They
gave the building permit to allow this to happen. The
developer is there. He is the one who allegedly did not
tell anyone, even when the workers were complaining
ofillness while they were building the houses. The bro-
kerwho sold the houses to everybody allegedly without
telling them is there too. Finally there are several gov-
ernment agencies involved, including EPA, and seven
different oil companies who deposited materials at the
site 40 years ago. The individuals representing the sev-
eral government agencies often tend to suspect that
their jurisdictional concerns will be given short shrift
bythe otheragencies. "Thegovernment" isbynomeans
monolithic. This is Orange County, a very conservative
kind ofarea. Some oftheresidents gotohear Lois Gibbs
from Love Canal give a lecture sponsored by an activist
political group viewed by many in Orange County as
"radical." The women find out that they can get this
group to come in and organize their community to get
some action. So this very conservative neighborhood
now has a "radical group" organizing them and that
makes the homeowners association even more upset.
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The community pressure is very effective. The Gov-
ernor's office instructs the Epidemiological Studies Sec-
tion of the State Health Department that an
epidemiological study will be done around this site.
In the public hearings there was great acrimony and
disagreement on some very basic points. Was there really
an odor problem from this site or were there only a few
troublemakers whowerecomplainingaboutodorswhich
actually came from the adjacent oil fields? Was there
really an increased incidence of a variety of subjective
respiratory complaints, infections, allergies, bleeding
gums, andphlebitis, andwastherepossiblyanincreased
incidence ofcancer and birth defects? We felt that prob-
ably we could get an idea ofthe magnitude ofthe odor
problem. We could get an idea of how common these
subjective complaints were, and at the least we could
look for a dramatic increase in cancer or birth defects.
Lessons
What do I want to point out about this episode? First
of all, the audience. Remember that it would be a mis-
take tothink we are dealing with only one constituency.
There were people with very different attitudes. There
was no mechanism in the community to talk to the peo-
ple in the neighborhoods. We are not in World War II
Americawhere one had airraid wardens oneveryblock.
Itreally falls to the health department to create amech-
anism. Otherwise, there is no way to talk to these peo-
ple, except through the press. We formed a citizens'
advisory committee and published our own newsletter.
The other lesson is that both epidemiologically and
toxicologically, no definitive answer was going to come
from the study. There was a small sample size: only
about 400 adults live there, and only about 60 pregnan-
cies had occurred in the four years since the community
had been established. So, there was not much power to
show effects of rare outcomes. There was adequate
powerto look at the subjective complaints and the odor.
Every bias known to man was operating here. There
was bias in recruitment, since people were starting to
selectively move out by the time we did our cross-sec-
tional survey. Obviously there was also going to be bias
in recall. There was going to be a problem for cancer,
in that the people had only been there for four years;
so except for pediatric cancer, we would not have ex-
pected there to be an increased incidence of cancer un-
less there was some promotor that was unmasking things
in a very powerful way. It turned out that despite all
ourgoodworkwith the laboratories, itwasverydifficult
to get good estimates of exposure. Airborne exposure
was the major concern there, and it came seasonally
and in waves during these odor episodes. It was very
difficult to get an air sample just at the moment there
was an odor. We decided to recruit local residents to
collect airsamples. Thatraised alotofinterestingissues
such as: Could one trust these people to open a stopcock
or would they spike it? Should we pay a professional to
come and do it? Later on, the oil companies did indeed
pay for someone to be there 24 hrs a day. However,
80% of the time the odor was gone by the time these
professionalsarrived atthecomplainant'sresidence. So,
it was difficult to get exposure data. In this particular
site there were high concentrations of sulfur dioxide.
There was also some concern about windborne arsenic
dust from certain areas ofthe surface. Benzene, which
occurs in any petroleum substance, and a substance called
tetrahydrothiophene, which has an odorthreshold of0.1
ppb and which was probably responsible for many of
the complaints, were also present.
We learned certain things from this experience. Do
not be afraid to lay out uncertainities about the data.
Once you have become committed to doing a study, you
get defensive about the weakness of what you can do.
Basically, even in a study like this, uncertainty can be
reduced considerably even though it cannot be reduced
to nothing. The community will intermittently get frus-
trated with you because they want to have absolute
certaintythatthereiszerorisk. Ofcourse, scientifically,
that cannot be done.
It is very important not be be afraid to lay out the
milestones ofwhat you are going to do and to calculate
the problems and delays which may arise. As a good
bureaucrat, you may not want to promise anything to
anybody, butbasically, whathappensthenisthatpeople
become more and more anxious because you will not
specify what is reasonable and what can be done. It is
a classic thing to promise step 1, knowing full well that
you don't have the resources for steps 2 and 3. When 2
and 3 come, you say, "Sorry, I don't have the re-
sources." People really get upset. It is far better to say
at the beginning, "Look folks, we'll go this far and then
we are going to have to wait until we can get the con-
tract through. That takes about three months in our
state."
Do not avoid contact with distrustful community
members. After a particularly angry person has called
you a liar three or four times, you tend to withdraw as
you do from a difficult patient. Youjust do not want to
deal with those people. But you have to. What you have
to do is create some kind ofstructure where some trust
can be established: regular meetings, newsletters, things
like that.
What did we do in this case? We decided on a number
of things. First, we involved the community activists
in those aspects ofthe study which did not violate their
neighbors' confidentiality. The first stage of the study
involved a census. Neighborhood workers went out and
knocked ondoors andhanded out acensusform. Ideally,
it should have been done in a sealed envelope that was
to bemailed in to us. Instead, the completed forms were
placed in sealed envelopes and returned to us by the
workers. We did not want these workers to gather the
information by interviews and bring it back, because it
was not appropriate for them to learn, for example,
whether a couple was married or unmarried. There are
issues, even in something as simple as a census, which
require confidentiality; and it is possible to involve the
community without violating that. We also had to deal
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with confidentiality when the results came out. We told
people that there would be certain things that we would
not reveal. We did not put pins onthe map sothey could
see where the cancer or the induced abortion occurred,
because they did not have the right to know that. They
could know the numbers, however, after they were col-
lated and analyzed. We also talked to them early on
about topics to be covered in the survey. There were a
variety of complaints that they brought up. For ex-
ample, even though it seemed unlikely to us to expect
phlebitis, it was on the questionnaire. If we had not
dealt with it, we would not have been responding to the
community.
The second thing we did was to ask the community
to select technically competent representatives to sit in
on an advisory committee with us. They chose a pedia-
tric oncologist who lived there and a professor at the
University ofCalifornia, San Diego, who was known to
be very concerned about environmental issues. We also
decided to include technical representatives from other
constituencies so that the oil companies could have some
corporate medical officers there. One of them hired a
medical epidemiologist to sit on this committee. Rep-
resentatives from a variety ofother bureaucracies that
were interested in this also attended. They all agreed
thatalthoughwewould sharewiththemourpreliminary
results they would not release these until we had a
chance to receive their criticisms and revise our ana-
lysis, ifnecessary, to make sure that everyone was sat-
isfied with the thoroughness ofthe analyses. We agreed
that there would be no lawyers present in this group.
Indeed, our own lawyers in the health department were
very uncomfortable about our talking to all these dif-
ferent people. We decided that we would release the
results of the study in sections as they were completed
rather than makingthe community wait until they were
all done. The study had four sections that dealt respec-
tively with adult health, pediatric health, obstetrics,
and pets. We decided we would not wait for scientific
publication and peer review. We believed that we had
about the most critical group we could possibly get and
that we should not induce an extra delay to gain more
scientific credibility. We also decided that we would
communicate directly with the community and not
through the newspapers. The goal was to make sure
that the constituencies knew that the process by which
we were analyzing the results was being done with the
utmost care. Everyone on the committee promised that
they were not going to be leaking results to anyone. It
was also important to us to come up against any objec-
tions during the analysis phase, rather than publish the
results and then have various constituencies come in
and start criticizing while the public watched. We wanted
to make sure that we dealt with the right issues, and
we wanted to make sure that there was clarity and lack
of bias in the results.
The procedure was that, once the group was estab-
lished, we would meet and discuss the results. Then we
would mail out the first phase of the analysis. For ex-
ample, if there was a public summary that would be
mailed out to each of the homeowners, the committee
wouldhave achancetocommentonthat. Thenwewould
meet, discuss the draft, and go back and revise. After
a while, committee members got tired of meeting in
Orange County all the time and agreed that they would
trust us to send the drafts out without havingmeetings.
We would call them, get their comments, and send the
revisions to the committee and the community simul-
taneously. The summaries, put in question and answer
format, were mailed to every homeowner in the area.
At the same time we sent a copy of the report to the
local library so that everybody knew that they could go
in and see the entire thing if they wanted to. A little
town meeting was held in the town library about two
weeks after that.
There was an interesting difference between the kind
of comments that we got from the industry group and
fromthe representatives ofthe community activists. As
you would expect, the industry people were concerned
that any positive results might be due to confounding
or bias, while the community activists were concerned
that any negative results might either be due either to
confounding orthat we had not looked carefully enough.
An example of industry's suggestions was that they
wanted to impose a more rigorous standard of compar-
isonthantheexposed andcontrolcommunities. Instead,
they wanted us to break the exposed community into
odor zones to see if there was a dose-response rela-
tionship. They asked us not to use the results from our
survey ofresidents about odor, but to use a study done
independently by the TRC Company that allowed them
to quantify odor zones. Interestingly, the result ofana-
lyzing by odor zones was to strengthen the study be-
cause there was a very dramatic correlation between
ourquestionnaire results on odors and theirassessment
of odors and a strong dose-response relationship for
many ofthe symptoms thatpeople complained of. We're
talkingabouttenfold differences withp values of0.0001.
But there were many symptoms that community mem-
bershad suggestedbeincludedinthequestionnaire that
did not show that gradient, so this association was se-
lective. Another example: industry representatives said,
"These are households. Their members may influence
each other's responses. Your p values are overesti-
mated. These are not independent samples." So we took
a random person from every household and looked at
the data in that way. The results were the same.
An example of the criticism from the activist group
related to a question about birth outcomes which asked
about pregnancy results (live birth, stillbirth, sponta-
neous abortion, etc., followed by an "other" category).
The "other" wascarefullydevisedtomeaninduced abor-
tion. Ourcommunity advisory grouphadsuggested that
we not ask that directly. There was a slight excess of
"other" outcomes inthe exposed group, and the concern
was that these might be misclassifications ortheymight
have been abortions induced for medical reasons. So,
we went back and reinterviewed those people. Indeed,
they were all induced abortions. One of them was due
to breakthrough bleeding. The rest of them had been
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for social reasons. We looked on the map and found that
the induced abortions were not related to the proximity
of the site.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we had a study which had many results
which were quite equivocal and open to argument. But
there were parts that we did not think were open to
argument. There were a hundred more people than ex-
pected complaining of odors in one neighborhood com-
pared with another neighborhood 5 miles away which
also was adjacent to an oil field. So, clearly, out of 600
people there was a significant minority that was com-
plaining. Close to 100% ofthe nearest blocks complained
of daily odor compared to an expected 4%. Anywhere
from 50 to 100 more people were complaining of sub-
jective symptoms than one would expect on the basis
ofthe control group. But ofcourse that's subjective, so
one could say, "they are lying." But even the oil com-
pany physicians, when they looked at this clear dose-
response pattern, found it hard to imagine that all of
this could be explained away on subjective bias. We did
not find any difference in cancer or birth defects, but
ofcourse we did nothave eitherthe powerorthe follow-
up to say much. However, ifone looks at the toxicology
and ourbestguess ofexposures onthebasis ofcomputer
modeling ofactual measurements ofthe emissions from
the site, one would not expect on the basis of risk as-
sessment to see an additional case of cancer even with
70-year exposure in that population, nor would one ex-
pect birth defects. Thus, the toxicology supports what
the epidemiology shows.
Because the opinion leaders in this community had
some input, had somebody looking over our shoulders,
and knew that we were being responsive to their con-
cerns, they were able to accept this for what it was.
No, we could not tell them for sure that there was zero
risk. Yes, therewasuncertainty. Butonthe otherhand,
this was about the best effort they could get at this
time. We had regular meetings for those who were con-
cerned. Only about 20 out of this community of about
500 to 600 adults regularly attended. They were satis-
fied that we had made our best effort to answer their
questions. So at this time, the health effects ofthe McColl
site are not a controversial issue. The alternative ofnot
having done this correctly and not having been respon-
sive to those community concerns would be a Love Canal-
type ofscenario where people willbe arguingthematter
forever.
By addressing the concerns of the several consti-
tuenciesinthisneighborhood andbyallowingtheirtech-
nical ombudspersons to review our studies while in
progress, we were able to provide information to this
community in a way which they have accepted on it
merits. Their input improved the quality of our expo-
sure measures, insured the comprehensiveness of the
health outcomes surveyed, and provided us with logis-
tical assistance in the crucial early stage of the study.
We have been able to move on to provide technical
assistance to the engineers as they begin the task of
safely removing the wastes.
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